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Thz MEmGzR PROBLEm IN 1914.
Acquisitions and mergers were historically the nation's first
monopoly problem. The first wave of mergers in the 1880's, many
of which were conspicuously monopolistic in character, led in 1890
to the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act. And the first anti-
trust case to reach the Supreme Court, United States v. E. C.
Knight Co.,1 involved a series of mergers by which the American
Sugar Refining Co. achieved a virtual monopoly. Despite failure
in this case because of the Court's narrow interpretation of the
scope of congressional power under the Sherman Act, the govern-
ment was more successful in subsequent antitrust suits, and the
enforcement of the Sherman Act early established the key role of
acquisitions and mergers when the result was a restraint of trade
or the achievement of monopoly.
2
However, the Sherman Act, as applied by the courts, has been
inadequate to prevent or to correct mergers which have gone far
to change the competitive characteristics of many of our major in-
dustries.3 The ineffectiveness of the Sherman Act test in dealing
with the problem of mergers is underscored by the conclusions
reached by Professor Handler in 1932:4
*The author is Chief of the Division of Economic Evidence, Bureau of
Industrial Economics, Federal Trade Commission. The views herein expressed
are his own and not necessarily those of the Federal Trade Commission. "It
is not possible to acknowledge indebtedness to all whose thinking, whether in
ormal opinions, in journal articles, or in personal discussions, has influenced
the development of my own ideas. The thoughts herein expressed owe much
to discussions with and memoranda prepared by members of the Division of
Economic Evidence in the course of enforcement work arising under Section
7. Special acknowledgment, however, is due to Dr. Betty Bock for critical
suggestions as the paper evolved from preliminary draft to its present form."
1156 U.S. 1 (1895).
2 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); Standard
Oil of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), and United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); United States v. Union Pacific
Rt X Co., 226 U.S. 61 (1912), and United States v. Southern Pacific Co., 259
US. 214 (1922); Temple Iron Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 324 (1912), and
United States v. Lehigh Valley R. I. Co., 254 U.S. 255 (1920).
3United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913); United States v. United
States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920); United States v. Columbia Steel Co.,
334 U. S. 495 (1948).
4 Handler, Industril Mergers and the Ant-ftwst Laws, 32 Co& .. R1.
179, 271 (1932).
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"No one can read the cases or study the recent mergers
without feeling that the chief effect of the federal anti-
trust laws in this field has been the prevention of com-
plete combination- the consolidation movement has not
been 6therwise repressed. The Sherman Law under the
latest pronouncement of the Court has imposed no serious
fetters upon the merger processes and an area large enough
to satisfy the most optimistic of promoters- 64% accord-
ing to the Harvester decision - has been left free of gov-
ernmental restraint. The virtual disappearance or dilution
of competition in a number of important industries has not
been prevented."
The committee reports and congressional debates that preceded
the enactment of the original Section 7, (originally designated Sec-
tion 8) of the Clayton Act were focused principally upon the evil
of the holding company as a monopoly device.5 The holding of stock
in one corporation by another corporation was said to be a device by
which the "trust" was given corporate form.6
"Section 7 deals with what is commonly known as the
'holding company,' which is a common and favorite method
of promoting monopoly. 'Holding company' is a term, gen-
erally understood to mean a company that holds the stock
of another company or companies, but as we understand
the term a 'holding company' is a company whose primary
purpose is to hold stocks of other companies. It has usually
issued its own shares in exchange for these stocks, and is
a means of holding under one control the competing com-
panies whose stocks it has thus acquired. As thus defined
a 'holding company' is an abomination and in our judg-
ment is a mere incorporated form of the old-fashioned
trust."
In the light of subsequent interpretations of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, it is significiant that in the congressional debates re-
ference was made to the possibility that a corporation might sell
all of its assets to another corporation or that the corporation might
go out of business or that its property might be acquired by an-
other corporation. In addressing himself to this possibility, Senator
Reed remarked that: 7
"When that is done, it means an increase of capital stock.
It means that there is given to the world knowledge of the
fact that the property and the business are thus controlled;
whereas, under the method of stock ownership, there has
been exercised in this country for years a secret control,
and frequently monopoly is almost completely worked out
through it."
5 See Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary, IL R. lEiP. No. 627,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. I at 17; Pt. II, at 6; Pt. MI at 7-8.6 Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary SEN. R . No. 698,
63d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 13, (1914); see also at 47.
7 51 CONG. REc. 14457 (1914).
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In continuing the debate, Senator Cummins pointed out8 that hold-
ing companies were also objectionable because the device permit-
ted a small investment to control very large corporate enterprises:
"There are many objections to holding companies, but
the chief one has not yet been suggested. The chief one is
that it permits a small amount of capital to control a very
large business. Ten percent, 15 percent, of the capital of a
corporation in a single hand, if the stock is widely distrib-
uted, will control it; and if that corporation be permitted
to buy another with equal capital it will control the addi-
tional capital, and so on and on, until you have put in a
single hand with a trifling amount of capital, as compared
with all that is involved, the power to control the whole
business, and that is what is going on in this country every
day. We all know it. It has been testified here over and over
again that 10 percent of the capital of a great corporation
will control its management and its policy."
The prohibition against the acquisition of the securities of one cor-
poration by another corporation engaged in commerce, as contained
in Section 7, as the Clayton Act was originally enacted, was not in-
tended simply to incorporate the Sherman Act prohibitions against
restraints of trade and attempts at monopoly. The Clayton Act
sought to establish a lesser and more immediate standard, prohibit-
ing acquisitions where the effect "may be to substantially lessen
competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and
the corporation making the acquistion, or to restrain such com-
merce in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly
in any line of commerce."9
The principal evil foreseen was the elimination of competition
between two companies engaged in the same line of commerce.
Conceivably, if a more active enforcement of the original Section
7 had not been foreclosed, the commission and the courts might
ultimately have been brought to deal with acquisitions of a ver-
tical character, where the evil was not the absorption of one com-
petitor by another but the monopolization of a source of supply or
the monopolistic control of market outlets.
In Section 7, as in other provisions of the Clayton Act, the
underlying purpose was to forestall the development of restraints
and monopolistic tendencies. Whereas the Sherman Act had proved
its competence to deal with combinations which accomplished a re-
straint of trade or a monopoly, the Clayton Act sought to prevent
acquisitions and mergers which may have the effect of substantially
lessening competition or of tending toward monopoly.
THE DEMISE OF TE ANTIMERGER LAW OF 1914.
As enacted in 1914, Section 7 of the Clayton Act provided "that
8 Id. at 14474.
9 38 STAT. 731 (1914).
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no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or in-
directly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital
of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where the effect
of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition be-
tween the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corpor-
ation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any
section or community, or tend to create monopoly in any line of
commerce."10 And the provision went on to inhibit the acquisition
by a corporation (a holding company) of the stock of two or more
corporations with the effect of lessening competition between them
in interstate commerce. (The section exempted acquisitions of stock
solely for investment purposes and specifically permitted the for-
mation of subsidiary corporations to carry on the immediate lawful
business of the parent company.)
As applied to the realities of corporate acquisitions, the Su-
preme Court in two lines of decision nullified the prohibitions of
Section 7. Although concluding that the Federal Trade Commis-
sion might prevent a corporation which was holding stock in a
competing corporation in violation of Section 7 from using its il-
legally held stock to accomplish the acquisition of the plant and
property of its competitor," the Court at the same time ruled that
the commission was without authority to require a corporation to
divest itself of a competitor's assets, even though acquired by means
of the illegal holding of the securities of that competitor, if the ac-
quisition of assets had preceded the commission's complaint.12 Eight
years later the Supreme Court was willing to permit a merger of
two competing electrical equipment manufacturers, accomplished
through a complex of holding company maneuvers, to be consum-
mated after the commencement of a commission preceeding to
compel the holding company to divest itself of the voting stock of
one of two competing companies.' 3
A second line of decisions resulted in a significant weakening
in the concept of what constituted competition between the ac-
quiring and acquired company. A single set of facts led Mr. Justice
Sutherland, who delivered the opinion of the Court, and the major-
ity of the justices to conclude that the International Shoe Co.
10 hb4
IIF.T.C. v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926).12 Thatcher Mfg. Co. v. F.T.C.; Swift & Co. v. F.T.C., 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
These interpretations brought a dissent from Justice Brandeis, in which Chief
Justice Taft and Justice Holmes and Stone joined. Even the single victory
proved an empty one when the Western Meat Co., having failed in its attempts
to divest itself of the stock, was permitted to buy the plant and property of
its competitor to satisfy a debt contracted prior to the original action seeking
divesture. 33 F.2d 824; 280 U.. 235, disnissed 281 U.S. 771 (1930).
1 3 Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co. v. FT.C, 291 U.S. 587 (1934).
[Vol. 14
ECONOMIC ISSUES
and the W. H. McElwain Co. were not significantly competitive,
whereas Justices Stone, Holmes and Brandeis found that they
were. 4 Both companies manufactured men's dress shoes and sold
them in the same communities in the same States. That Interna-
tional sold largely through dealers in small communities while
McElwain sold principally through wholesalers and larger retailers
in the larger cities was held to establish that the two products
were not substantially competitive.
The ultimate effect of these decisions was to encourage ac-
quiring corporations to purchase the assets rather than the secur-
ities of other companies. In practice, corporations were left free
to acquire either securities or assets, knowing that, if challenged,
it would be possible to use any stockholdings to accomplish a full
merger and transfer of assets from the acquired company. Thus,
Section 7 of the Clayton Act became an unenforceable law, wholly
ineffective in coping with successive merger movements, particular-
ly in the 1920's and again after 1945. Beginning in 1927, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission included among its recommendations for
legislation proposals for the amendment of Section 7. In 1945 and
in every Congress thereafter, amendatory legislation was intro-
duced. Finally, the 81st Congress passed and on December 29, 1950,
the President signed the Celler Act, amending Section 7.
THE AaENmED SECTION 7
As amended,15 Section 7 provides "That no corporation en-
gaged in commerce shall acquire... the whole or any part of the
stock or other share capital" or "the whole or any part of the assets
of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any
line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend
to create a monopoly." Secticn 7 is thus modified in two essential
respects; it applies to acquisitions of assets as well as to acquisitions
of securities, and it seeks to deal with all acquisitions of whatever
description that have the unwanted effect of substantially lessen-
ing competition.
Congressional committees had for many years expressed con-
cern over the level of economic concentration, particularly as ac-
complished through corporate mergers and acquisitions, and had
been concerned with the ineifectiveness of both the Sherman Act
and the Clayton Act to halt the trend. In its report accompanying
the Act, the Senate Judiciary Committee stated explicitly that
"The purpose of the proposed bill, ... is to limit future increases
in the level of economic concentration resulting from corporate
14 International Shoe Co. v. F.T.C., 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
1s 64 STAT. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18.
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mergers and acquisitions" and "thereby aid in preserving small
business as an important competitive factor in the American econ-
omy."16
The Senate Judiciary Committee was specific in announcing
its purpose "to make this legislation extend to acquisitions which
are not forbidden by the Sherman Act,""r and the House Judiciary
Committee affirmed the same point: 1
8
"Acquisitions of stock or assets have a cumulative ef-
fect and control of the market sufficient to constitute a vio-
lation of the Sherman Act may be achieved not in a single
acquisition but as the result of a series of acquisitions. The
bill is intended to permit intervention in such a cumulative
process when the effect of an acquisition may be a signifi-
cant reduction in the vigor of competition, even though this
effect may not be so far-reaching as to amount to a combi-
nation in restraint of trade, create a monopoly, or consti-
tute an attempt to monopolize. Such an effect may arise
in various ways: such as elimination in whole or in ma-
terial part of the competitive activity of an enterprise
which has been a substantial factor in competition, increase
in the relative size of the enterprise making the acquisition
to such a point that its advantage over its competitors
threatens to be decisive, undue reduction in the number
of competing enterprises, or establishment of relationships
between buyers and sellers which deprive their rivals of
a fair opportunity to compete.
"Under H.R. 2734, a merger or acquisition will be un-
lawful if it may have the effect of either (a) substantially
lessening competition or (b) tending to create a monopoly.
These two tests of illegality are !ntended to be similar to
those which the courts have applied in interpreting the
same language as used in other sections of the Clayton
Act. Thus, it would be unnecessary for the Government to
speculate as to what is in the 'back of the minds' of those
who promote a merger; or to prove that the acquiring firm
had engaged in actions which are considered to be unethi-
cal or predatory; or to show that as a result of a merger
the acquiring firm had already obtained such a degree of
control that it possessed the power to destroy or exclude
competitors or fix prices."
Thus, the Congress sought to conform Section 7 to the underlying
preventive purpose of the Clayton Act.
The test of illegality under the amended Section 7 is no longer
the lessening of competition between the corporate parties to the
merger or acquisition. The new Section 7 applies to all acquisitions
15 Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, SEN. REP. No. 1775,
81st Cong., 2d. Sess. 3 (1950).
17 Id. at 4.
18 Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary, H. R REP. No. 1191,
81st Cong., 1st Seass. 8 (1950).
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which may have the effect of substantially lessening competition.
The test of a substantial lessening of competition or of a tendency
toward monopoly is not limited to those situations which are of
nation-wide or industry-wide significance. The act forbids acqui-
sitions which, "in any line of commerce in any section of the coun-
try," may effect a lessening of competition or set in motion a ten-
dency toward monopoly. The Senate Judiciary Committee elabor-
ated on the new significance of "in any line of commerce in any
section of the country -"
"To make clearer the intent to give the bill broad ap-
plication ... its wording has been broadened in certain re-
spects. Thus, the phrase 'in any section of the country' was
made applicable to both the lessening of competition and
the tendency to create a monopoly. As the bill originally
stood, it applied only to the former. Hence, an acquisition
is not to be interpreted merely in terms of either its effect
upon competition or its tendency to create a monopoly 'in
the Nation as a whole.' The act is to be violated if, as the
result of an acquisition, there would be a substantial less-
ening of competition or a tendency to create a monoply
in any section of the country."' 9
In supplying a similar explanation with respect to the phrase
"in any line of commerce," the Senate Judiciary Committee added
that "It is intended that acquisitions which substantially lessen com-
petition, as well as those which tend to create a monopoly, will be
unlawful if they have the specified effect in any line of commerce,
whether or not that line of commerce is a large part of the busi-
ness of any of the corporations involved in the acquisition. ' 20
This change in language was also believed by the Judiciary
Committee to serve the further purpose of emphasizing that the
Clayton Act tests were different from and lesser than those ap-
plicable under the Sherman Act. In explaining this position, the
committee stated: 2'
"The Committee believes that the excessive sweep that
has been given to Section 7 of the present Clayton Act
[original act] by these two features of that section has been
largely responsible for the tendency of the courts in cases
under that Section to revert to the Sherman Act test. By
eliminating the provisions of the existing section that ap-
pear to reach situations of little economic significance, it
is the purpose of this legislation to assure a broader con-
struction of the more fundamental provisions that are re-
tained than has been given in the past. The committee wish
to make it clear that the bill is not intended to revert to
the Sherman Act test. The intent here, as in other parts
9 Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, SEN. REP. No. 1775,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950).
2o Ibid.
21 Id. at 4-5.
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of the Clayton Act, is to cope with monopolistic tendencies
in their incipiency and well before they have attained such
effects as would justify a Sherman Act proceeding."
And the Senate Report added: 22
"These various additions and deletions -some streng-
thening and others weakening the bill -are not conflict-
ing in purpose and effect. They merely are different steps
toward the same objective, namely that of framing a bill
which, though dropping portions of the so-called Clayton
Act test that have no economic significance, reaches far be-
yond the Sherman Act."
The remainder of this paper is concerned with the problems
arising in the economic analysis of acquisitions and mergers. It is
not concerned with the legal adequacy of evidence or with the
legality or illegality of specific acquisitions or categories of acqui-
sitions. The examples selected are not facsimiles of actual acquisi-
tions under study but are fabricated solely to illustrate the dis-
cussion.
AIsmmqTRATivE RESPONSIBILTIS UNDER SEcTION 7
The Federal Trade Commission, with the amendment of Sec-
tion 7, is newly charged with responsibility for dissolving acquisi-
tions or mergers which threaten a substantial lessening of compe-
tition or exhibit a tendency toward monopoly, in regional as well
as national markets, in specific lines of commerce as well as in
larger industries.
A first step in the administration of Section 7 has been the
establishment of a system of monitoring acquisitions and mergers.
On the basis of announcements in the financial press and trade
papers, the commission has listed mergers and acquisitions, both
those contemplated and those accomplished. The monitoring oper-
ation has resulted in the listing of from 50 to 90 transactions a
month, a total of some 703 in 1951 and some 822 in 1952.
The number of acquisitions recorded has raised the question
whether a new wave of mergers has been stimulated by the en-
actment of the amendment to the Clayton Act, whether trade and
industry have been seeking to accomplish acquisitions before en-
forcement machinery gets into igh gear. No data are available that
would indicate that this is so. A simple explanation appears to be
that a more inclusive survey has resulted in identifying more acqui-
sitions and that many acquisitions are now potentially subject to
the Clayton Act which would not have come within the scope of
the former statutory provisions.
A second step involves a preliminary examination or screening
of the recorded acquisitions. Those acquisitions which appear, on
the basis of what is known of the industry, to involve no signifi-
22d. at 5.
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cant lessening of competition are eliminated from further consider-
ation. The remaining acquisitions are segregated into two groups:
those which appear to be of primary importance are immediately
assigned for further investigation; the remainder are necessarily
put aside for investigation as resources permit.
The investigation begins with the preparation of letters of in-
quiry to the parties to the merger or acquisition. This is preceded
by a sufficient examination of the companies and of the industry
to permit an identification of the areas where competition may be
significantly affected. The letters of inquiry seek to develop what
information the companies can supply relative to their positions in
the industry and in the markets that appear to be competitively
significant.
Only rarely can the corporation's reply reveal all the economic
consequences of the transaction. Additional information on the
structure and behavior of the industry, the extent and character
of the markets affected, and the relation of the merging companies
to these markets and to other competitors in the industry are es-
sential to any final judgment.
If office investigation indicates that the acquisition may pro-
duce a substantial lessening of competition, a field investigation is
recommended. An investigation focuses particularly on economic
facts relating to a determination by the commission of the extent
and character of the competitive consequences of the acquisition
or merger; it is concerned more with industries and markets than
with the parties to the acquisition and their conduct. If a complaint
is issued, the Section 7 proceedings follow the usual course of
cases before the commission.
The Clayton Act makes no provision for advisory opinions re-
specting the legality of proposed acquisitions in advance of the
consummation of a transaction. Nevertheless, counsel for corpor-
ations contemplating mergers have on numerous occasions sub-
mitted their plans to the commission's staff with a request for an
informal expression of opinion. Such voluntary submissions are
usually supplemented by replies to a letter of inquiry which the
commission's staff prepares in order to develop what additional
information appears to be necessary.
The commission's staff is unable to give final answers to those
who submit proposals for acquisitions. The staff can only say that on
the basis of the available facts it would, or would not, recommend
that an investigation be undertaken if the merger should be con-
summated.
The informal opinion of the commission's staff has no binding
effect upon the proponents of the proposed merger. In some in-
stances a negative opinion by the commission's staff results in a
19533
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dropping of the merger plan. In others the merger is consummated.
Thus, when counsel for Pillsbury Mills, Inc., submitted its plan
to acquire Ballard & Ballard Co., the commission's staff advised
that such an acquisition would raise serious questions regarding
competitive consequences which would necessarily require a
thorough investigation. Nevertheless, Pillsbury Mills acquired
Ballard & Ballard Co.; after further investigation, the commission,
on June 16, 1952, issued its complaint charging that the acquisition
of Ballard & Ballard Co., and also of the Duff Division of Ameri-
can Foods, Inc., constituted a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act. This became the first formal proceeding under the new law.
EXAMNING THE COMPETITI CONSEQUENCES OF MERGERS
1. The Orientation of the Statute.
In its revision of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the Congress
recognized the connection which has historically existed between
acquisitions and mergers and the changing character of competi-
tion in our national economy. Through the years, the growth of
industry by acquisition had produced a twofold effect: there had
been a loss of important competitors, both on an industry-wide
basis and in terms of specific markets; and there had been a
change in the character of competition as a larger percentage of
production in industry after industry had come under the control
of a few companies.
The broadly stated objectives of Section 7 recognize that com-
petition is not static and that rigid rules cannot be established to
define illegal acquisitions. The Act gives the commission two
tests by which to judge illegal acquisitions and mergers: An ac-
quisition or merger which may result in (1) a substantial lessen-
ing of competition or (2) in a tendency toward monopoly. These
tests are distinct, and an affirmative finding respecting one suffices
to condemn the acquisition. A substantial lessening of competition
may appear as the immediate consequence of the merger or it may
result from a series of developments the character of which cannot
be precisely blueprinted in advance. However, a tendency toward
monopoly would normally be expected to appear only as a long-
run consequence, since few mergers would be attempted if mo-
nopoly were the immediate and obvious outcome.
2. The Prospective Character of Section 7 Judgments.
The commission is directed to proceed against acquisitions
where the effect may be to substantially lessen competition.
The test is prospective. The commission is not required to
prove the actual consequences of the acquisition but only the rea-
sonable probability that a lessening of competition will result. In
its discussion of the ?mendment, the Senate Judiciary Committee
emphasized that reasonable probability rather than "mere possi-
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bility" was intended to govern: "The words 'may be' appear in the
bill in defining the effect on competition of the forbidden acquisi-
tion. Acquisitions are forbidden only where in any line of commerce
in any section of the country the effect 'may be' substantially to
lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly.
"The words 'may be' have been in Section 7 of the Clayton
Act since 1914. The concept of reasonable probability conveyed by
these words is a necessary element in any statute which seeks to
arrest restraints of trade in their incipiency andt before they de-
velop into full-fledged restraints violative of the Sherman Act. A
requirement of certainty and actuality of injury to competition is
incompatible with any effort to supplement the Sherman Act by
reaching incipient restraints." 2
3
The longer action is delayed in identifying and terminating
acquisitions which violate the Clayton Act, the greater is the pos-
sibility of irreparable damage to competition. The commission may
not await an examination of the actual consequences of a merger,
which might involve years of waiting and investigation, for that
course would remove all possibility of restoring competitive con-
ditions comparable to those which prevailed before the merger.
The statute, therefore, places upon the commission the necessity
of adopting procedures which facilitate prompt findings respecting
the prospective effects of an acquisition.
3. Selection of Cases.
In reviewing the acquisitions which have been recorded from
the financial press, it is obvious that many, perhaps even most of
them, have no critical economic consequences. As it first comes up
for consideration, an acquisition record is accompanied by such
information as is available in the financial manuals, supplemented
by any additional facts recently reported in the financial press. Gen-
eral background information about the industry and markets, to-
gether with the conventional and skeletal facts which are known
about the two companies, constitute the basis upon which an initial
determination must be made whether the acquisition warrants pre-
liminary investigation.
Two years' experience in examining recorded mergers have re-
sulted in the development of certain rule-of-thumb questions, the
answers to which may convince the analyst that he knows enough
about the industry and the probable consequences of the merger
to say that further investigation is unnecessary, or the questions
may focus on particular unknowns that must be clarified before
concluding that the matter warrants serious study or that it may
safely be dismissed without further attention.
23 SmN. REP. No. 1775, 81st, Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1950).
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The law itself, with its stated exemptions and exclusions, pro-
vides the first grounds upon which some acquisitions may be dis-
missed. Unincorporated businesses and corporations not engaged in
interstate commerce are by definition excluded from the Act. The
Act also provides exemption for acquisitions, presumably partial
stock acquisitions, solely for investment, and it permits corpora-
tions engaged in commerce to form subsidiaries and to acquire their
stock for the purpose of carrying on "their immediate lawful busi-
ness, or the natural or legitimate branches or extensions thereof,
... when the effect of such formation is not to substantially lessen
competition." The Act also exempts from the prohibitions of Sec-
tion 7 those transactions which are consummated pursuant to the
authority of other regulatory agents - the Civil Aeronautics Board,
Federal Communications Commission, Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, Securities and Exchange Commission exercising juris-
diction under Section 10 of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act, the United States Maritime Administration or the Secretary
of Agriculture.
In examining other acquisitions, no one fact places a transaction
beyond the need for scrutiny and similarly no one fact suffices to
mark out a merger for study. In each instance the competitive
structure and behavior of the industry are significant, as well as
the characteristics 6f the companies which are being merged.
Moreover, it matters little whether the merger takes the form of
an acquisition of assets or of a purchase of securities; the same
competitive problems arise and similar competitive consequences
are to be expected. With these qualifications in mind, the questions
which are presented by certain types of acquisitions may be con-
sidered briefly.
Plant acquisitions are an every-day occurrence. When one is
reported, the first question concerns the use which has been made
of the plant and what effect the disposal of the plant will have
upon the future business of the selling corporation. Many small
plant disposals involving facilities which are either unused or which
are being sold as a consequence of a consolidation of operations or
a relocation of the business can be dismissed as having no competi-
tive significance. At the other extreme are the large transactions
which in effect mean the acquisition of a going business or of a
product-line or division of a business. In these instances the prob-
lem presented is not properly speaking the acquisition of space but
rather the acquisition of a business.
Similarly varied situations are encountered when equipment
acquisitions are examined. Many represent a chance to buy at bar-
gain prices equipment which is going out of production, and a num-
ber of these have been followed shortly by a second sale of the
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same assets as the bargain proved to be less attractive. When an
equipment acquisition assumes large proportions and becomes, in
fact, the acquisition of an entire operation, it is no longer a routine
transaction.
Patent acquisitions reflect a varied industrial picture. Patent
acquisitions or the acquisitions of rights under a patent frequently
occur when a new product moves from the development to the pro-
duction stage, particularly where the product is one whose mar-
keting calls for large financing. In the past patent acquisitions have
sometimes been used to effect a concentration in the control of an
industry's technology in the hands of a single interest. Consequent-
ly, any purchase of a conspicious number of important patents
requires that consideration be given to the possibility that the
patent transfers may result in a regimentation of the industry, in
a system of private controls which would be detrimental to the
continuance of competition.
In recent years there have been many purchases and sales of
loosely held assets, that is, production facilities which have been
employed in a secondary business. A number of such transactions
involve the disposal of side-lines or new productive operations de-
veloped by large corporations, perhaps the outcome of research
in areas of their primary interest. Such divestments, particularly
to newly established corporations, may accomplish a healthy in-
crease in the corporate population. Other transactions have involv-
ed a withdrawal of corporations from wartime activities. Where the
demand for the product has declined and the industry is adequately
competitive, the transaction raises no public interest questions. On
the other hand, where the disposal of the facility is to a leading
corporation in an already highly concentrated industry, an in-
quiry into the competitive consequences appears to be required.
Many of the acquisitions recorded are small, both in dollar
amount and in relation to the number of companies or the average
size of a company in the industry in question. The merger of two
small companies causes no concern when many companies serve
the market. Similarly, where the optimum size for efficient oper-
ation is larger than the merging firms, the transaction may be pro-
motive of healthy competition. On the other hand, where the in-
dustry is dominated by a few large companies, even small acquisi-
tions may have to be examined to determine whether the cumu-
lative effect of such acquisitions will lead to a substantial lessen-
ing of competition.
Where the acquired and acquiring companies are directly
competitive, where they are of substantial size and where they
are selling the same or similar products in the same markets, fur-
ther inquiry is obviously indicated. How much of the common mar-
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kets will the merged company occupy? Will the loss of one com-
petitor mean a decline in the scope and vigor of competition? Will
the hazards of competition be so increased for small firms and new
competitors that the latter will be eliminated, even though they
are capable of meeting competitive standards of efficiency in pro-
duction and marketing?
Where a substantial company is acquired by one of the larger
firms in the industry, even though neither company ranks as a
leader in its market, the competitive consequences of the loss of a
significant competitor must be evaluated. What has happened to
competition in this and similar industries as large companies have
come to account for an increasing portion of production and sales?
What has been the mortality experience of small firms, and how
many new firms have successfully established themselves in the
industry? What evidence is there of the ability of the medium and
small firms to compete with the larger firms in the introduc-
tion of new products, in the adoption of new technologies, and in
reducing prices?
Vertical acquisitions give rise to difficult and perplexing prob-
lems even when the acquiring and acquired companies are in no
way competitive. These acquisitions take many forms: a manu-
facturer may act to assure a c on t in u o u s supply of raw ma-
terials; a producer of basic materials may integrate forward to un-
dertake further manufacturing or processing; a manufacturer of
final products may acquire distributors and seek to control the
marketing of its own product.
The economic questions that arise in analyzing the conse-
quences of vertical acquisitions cannot be precisely delineated in
advance. The critical questions normally relate to more than one
market level. How significantly will the open-market supplies of
the relevant products be reduced? How many users are dependent
upon the market supply, and what alternatives are available to
them if this market shrinks? What opportunities exist for the es-
tablishment of new firms and an expansion in production to replace
the market supply which has been absorbed by the acquisition?
Will the integration create a market situation where nonintegrated
producers are dependent upon competitors for raw materials or for
the sale of their production? And if this last situation prevails, how
important is the product in the costs of the nonintegrated competi-
tors?
In the preliminary examination of acquisitions and mergers,
the importance of the competitive characteristics of the markets
deserves emphasis. It is in changes in the structure and functioning
of markets that the best evidence of competitive consequences
must be sought. It may be many years before clinical studies will
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lay the foundation for confident use of complex economic evi-
dence- the number and size of the competing companies, the al-
ternative choices available to buyers and sellers, the share of the
market occupied by the acquiring company and its competitors,
the opportunities for new firms to enter the industry, the competi-
tive mores of industries and markets, et cetera - in forecasting the
competitive consequences of mergers. New tools of economic anal-
ysis can be forged only on the basis of case-by-case studies.
4. Injuries to Competition.
Three broad categories of injury to competition can be de-
scribed. It is quite another matter to identify in particular situa-
tions the precise injury to competition which is most important.
Enough work has been done in a preliminary way to demonstrate
that injury to competition may take novel forms, and from time
to lime field investigations focus attention on new and unfamiliar
forms of injury.
A lessening of competition or an injury to competition may be
found on three levels in the economy. First, there is the possibility
that an acquisition or merger will work injury to individual firms,
either competitors or actual or potential suppliers or buyers. Evi-
dence of such injury normally depends upon the testimony of in-
dividual complainants. This is technically the easiest type of com-
petitive injury to find if witnesses are available. It is also a type
of injury as to which conclusions must be drawn with great care,
since what injures one competitor may appear as more effective
competition by another competitor.
The second order of injury to competition relates to a deteriora-
tion in competitive markets through some such development as
reduction in the number of sellers or buyers, a diversion of supplies
from competitive markets, the erection of barriers against the entry
of new firms, or the removal of a crucial competitor. A demonstra-
tion of this type of injury'requires a careful analysis of present
and prospective markets. It requires that the tribunal, commission
or court, be presented with fully developed facts and carefully
wrought reasoning to understand the nature of the injury to the
competitive market. It is a costly and time-consuming case to de-
velop, but it presents a significant appraisal of competitive condi-
tions.
A third type of injury to competition arises from a deteriora-
tion in the competitive tone of the economy. This results from a
change in the character of the incentives which guide corporate
managements, and may be the consequence of one company be-
coming a dominant power in the industry or of control being con-
centrated in the hands of a small number of leaders. This type of
weakening in the competitive economy has long been recognized
1953]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
and much debated, involving such familiar problems as the reluc-
tance of new capital to enter these fields, difficulties in promoting
industrial research, undue caution in introducing new technologies,
a disposition to follow live-and-let-live policies in relations with
strong competitors. The problem is extremely complex because
these are matters which properly lie within the discretion of cor-
porate management. As has been observed, one cannot compel
competition; one can only endeavor to create or sustain an environ-
ment in which competition becomes the normal code of business be-
havior. Acquisitions and mergers which do not work immediate in-
jury to competitors or to market structures may nevertheless by a
process of geological erosion change the basic attitudes of corporate
management and weaken the competitive tone of the economy.
RECURRING PROBLEMS IN THE
ExAMINATION OF MERGERS
Competition is the foundation of the free enterprise economy,
yet its anatomy is little understood either by business men who
practice it or by administrators who seek to enforce it. Competition
is fundamentally a complex of production and marketing practhes
which arises and is self-sustaining in industries and markets which
are so organized as to compel independent decisions by individual
business units. Business rivalry survives but effective competition
is gone in industries or markets wthere decisions on production,
price and sales are made collectively or with a foreknowledge of
the conduct which other business rivals will pursue.
Competition is the keystone of government policy toward
business and industry because competition is believed to promote
an efficient and impersonal direction of economic activity which is
responsive both to the opportunities to produce and to the needs
of consumers for products. Competition has the high public office
of assuring efficiency and economy in industry. Efficient competi-
tors are presumably rewarded with enlarged opportunities, while
inefficient competitors are eliminated and the resources which
they have employed are released for more competent producers.
At each stage from raw material to finished product, free markets
test the efficiency of competing producers or distributors, reward-
ing the competent with larger profits and expanding their oppor-
tunities while penalizing the inefficient with losses.
The incidence of competition varies from industry to industry
and from one phase of the business cycle to another. Whether
competition focuses on price, on product improvement or differ-
entiation, on greater efficiencies, on sales efforts, on combinations
and illegal agreements, is in significant degree a function of the
organization of the industry. Consumers, workers, and investors
all benefit when competition impels producers to seek reductions
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in costs, improvements in products, a better organization of pro-
duction, and the development of improved technologies, for in such
progress lies the basis for sustaining and improving the standard
of living.
Analysis of probable competitive effects of an acquisition be-
gins with the competitive pattern of the industry as a whole and
of its markets, particularly in the period preceding the acquisition.
From such facts and from information about the specific merger
or acquisition, an estimate must be made of what changes in the
character of competition in the industry and markets will follow
from the transaction.
The underlying purpose of Section 7 to prevent acquisitions
from producing a substantial lessening of competition requires that
the question - what is a competitive industry? - be asked. No easy
answer may be expected, for no simple calculus of easily calculated
magnitudes will yield a definitive solution. The answer must come
as a result of a fully informed judgment which will command assent
only if the economic facts and their analysis are explicitly set forth.
In the world of business, decision can never await a marshalling
of all the facts, and when government operates on the affairs of
business, it cannot be asked to do the impossible. In the regulation
of corporate acquisitions and mergers, governmental decisions must
come promptly and explicitly. Decision must be preceded by asking
the relevant questions and weighing the obtainable facts, but when
this has been done, justice to business and the public requires that
judgment be prompt, that it not be postponed in striving for per-
fection in the collection of data.
1. The Identification and Evaluation of the
Competitive Consequences of Mergers.
The most perplexing problems in the administration of Section
7 relate to the economic evidence on the basis of which to establish
whether a substantial lessening of competition or a tendency toward
monopoly must be anticipated as a result of an acquisition or
merger.
Competition cannot be measured directly, and hence, no single
standard suffices to weigh the economic effects of all acquisitions
or even of a single acquisition. Competitive practices differ in dif-
ferent industries, and moreover, the significance of the same com-
petitive activities varies from one industry to another and even
from one competitor to another within an industry. Consequently,
what an informed judgment requires in one case may carry little
persuasion in another.
a. Industries and Marcets
The basic economic facts respecting an acquisition relate to the
definition and competitive character of the market or markets in
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which the companies operate. Information secured from the parties
to the acquisition will identify these markets. The companies may
also supply facts which are relevant with respect to changes in their
positions in the several markets in which they buy and sell, but
they will seldom be able to supply all of the essential facts about
these markets. Yet the particular significance of these changes
must be judged in terms of the overall characteristics of the ap-
propriate markets.
In some cases even the identification of the relevant markets
may present difficulties. If a paper manufacturer acquires a pulp
company, will the competitive effects be confined to the market
for pulp, or will they also appear in the market for paper products?
And if competition in the manufacture of paper is affected, what
will be the range of paper products which must be studied to de-
termine the economic consequences? Even the identification of
geographic markets may be difficult, for changes in production in
one market area may lead to shortages or surpluses in other mar-
ket areas.
What market areas are affected when two regional companies,
meeting only on the periphery of their territories, or perhaps not
selling in direct competition at all, are brought under common
management? If a bakery operating along the Atlantic seaboard
combines with one operating throughout the Middle West, are
there no competitive effects, or are the competitive effects to be
sought in the whole area served by the new company? If a dairy
company which is strong north of the Mason-Dixon Line combines
with one which is a leader in the Southeast, is there a substantial
lessening of competition, and if so, is it confined to the loss of po-
tential competition that might come from one invading the other's
territory, or is there a change in competition identified with bring-
ing a larger portion of the industry under the management of
regional or national companies?
What markets are influenced when a company which has been
manufacturing one line of chemicals or pharmaceuticals acquires
another company that has been manufacturing a different line?
May the conclusion be that there are no competitive effects or shall
an examination be made of the consequences for short-line com-
panies of additional competition from long-line companies? And
how do long-line companies conduct competition with other long-
line companies, as contrasted with the way in which they behave
toward short-line companies? In the process of lengthening their
line, companies may choose to establish new subsidiaries or they
may seek to acquire operating units; are the competitive effects
the same?
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b. Immediate and Long-Ternm Consequences.
Every substantial acquisition produces not one but several com-
petitive consequences. Every acquisition, save the one that elim-
inates the last competitor from the market, may increase competi-
tive pressures for some firms, even though the ultimate effect is
to move the industry along the road toward a limitation of com-
petition. Virtually every acquiring company can point to some way
in which competition will be increased. Acquiring its own source
of raw materials may enable it to maintain production and sales
in a period of shortage. The addition of a new product-line may
enable the large distributor to infuse more competitive vigor into
the marketing of the acquired product-line. Diversification, by sup-
porting the firm during seasonal loss, may make it a stronger com-
petitor with both the old and the new product-lines. As long as
there is one larger firm in the industry, the acquisition of new
capacity by other firms may be alleged to create stronger com-
petition for the dominant company. If a company is the largest
in its industry, it may argue that acquiring a regional company
will enable it to enhance competition in markets which have not
heretofore known its products. If the two companies are directly
competitive, it may be argued that the larger firm will be able to
operate and sell with greater economy and that it will have to do
so because of competition from the remaining firms in the industry.
Similarly, any firm which is unable to meet the competition of
a larger rival, which finds its markets invaded, its sources of raw
materials cut off, its sales diminishing, may argue that the acquisi-
tion has resulted, or will result, in a substantial lessening of com-
petition.
Any appraisal of competitive consequences must look beyond
the effects upon individual firms of the changes in competitive
markets. Very often the acquisitions which carry the greatest men-
ace to the survival of healthful competition may initially produce a
flare-up of competitive activity which may be interpreted as en-
hancing competition. And conversely, the large acquisition which
arouses no apprehension among competitors or customers or sup-
pliers may seal the doom of a competition which is already so
atrophied that no one sees any hope of its being preserved.
To predict the immediate results of an acquisition calls for a
measure of prophecy. To arrive at a final evaluation of ultimate
consequences requires an informed judgment that, with the aid of
past experience and present facts, sees beyond the years.
c. Tests of Competitive Consequences.
The economic effects of mergers and acquisitions on competi-
tive markets must be examined qualitatively and quantitatively.
The qualitative question is whether, and in what respects, the ac-
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quisition or merger results in a lessening of competition. The quan-
titative question relates to the substantiality of the competitive
effects and their measurement.
No two acquisitions raise precisely the same competitive ques-
tions. Indeed, it is unsafe to use the same economic analysis for
the same industry in examining successive mergers, for acquisi-
tions, like time, bring changes to industries and markets.
Much of the public discussion with respect to mergers has been
addressed consciously or unconsciously to mergers between direct
competitors. At one extreme there would be little difficulty in con-
cluding that the merger of two local gas stations could have little
continuing effect upon competitive markets. The buyer of gasoline
enjoys a choice of sources by reason of his own mobility. But even
if this were not so, the merger would not cause great concern,
since it is easy for new gas stations to enter the field.
Similarly, one would have little difficulty in concluding that
a merger of two large petroleum companies competing for the same
markets could have serious competitive consequences, not only
for consumers of gasoline but also for operators of filling stations.
Between these two extremes lies a variety of market situations
where the number of competitors, their relative size, the facility
with which consumers shift from one seller to another, and the
ease with which new competitors may enter the market are all
material factors in interpreting the competitive consequences.
Where competing firms merge, one of the questions is what
share of the market did each occupy and what share of the mar-
ket will the new firm possess. The question is, of course, un-
answerable in that form, unless it is possible to measure the total
market, which cannot always be done. The absence of specific
data does not relieve the commission of responsibility to arrive at
a judgment regarding the competitive consequences of a merger.
Nor does the impracticability of securing the best measures of com-
petitive effects render legal a merger which results in a substan-
tial lessening of competition.
Assuming, however, that it is possible to arrive at satisfactory
measures of market shares, what significance attaches to these
figures? What is more important, that two merging companies each
account for X percent of a common market, or that these two are
the smallest among twelve, or conversely, the largest among twen-
ty-five competitors? If one of the largest in the market acquires
one among the second group, what is more significant- the in-
crease in the size of the larger firm or the disappearance from the
market of an effective competitor?
The answer to these questions lies in the competitive structure
of the market and in the nature of the competitive practices which
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prevail. No mechanical application of yardsticks can conceivably
yield a solution. Yet with an analysis of the salient market char-
acteristics and of the relation of the merging companies to that
market, an informed judgment, resting on experience with com-
petitive practices in many industries, becomes possible.
What are the significant market shares when the acquisition
is not of a competing firm? Where the acquisition takes the form of
vertical integration, the inquiry must be addressed to the adequacy
of the remaining market supply in relation to the market demand.
Where the vertical integration carries forward into fabrication,
the analysis must focus on the probabilities of squeezes with re-
spect to nonintegrated fabricators who are dependent upon the in-
tegrated company, of denial of supply, of inducing other large pro-
ducers to integrate forward until ultimately the nonintegrated
fabricators are eliminated. Similar considerations arise when the
integration is carried another step to the control of the outlets
through which the products reach their ultimate markets. In any
analysis of vertical acquisitions it may not be assumed that the
competitive effects are confined to the market in which the acquired
company has sold.
Acquisitions that involve diversification, a lengthening of the
product-line or an entry into new markets will hardly be illuminat-
ed, and will certainly not be resolved, in terms of any simple sta-
tistical approach. Although such an acquisition normally leads to
no reduction in the number of sellers, it does involve a reorienta-
tion in market strategy which may increase or diminish the induce-
ments to vigorous competition.
The competitive effects of an acquisition may mature slowly,
and these delayed effects may be of more moment than those which
appear early. Whether competitors will have an opportunity to con-
tinue to do business profitably, whether small firms will find the
way to growth and expansion foreclosed, whether new firms will
be able to enter the industry without undue handicaps, whether
new capital will find the industry an attractive investment, whether
open-market supplies of raw materials and semi-finished products
will remain adequate to the demand -these matters may be of
greater significance than the immediate consequences of the ex-
panded business to the acquiring firm.
No one theory will fit all acquisition cases. Both in terms
of economic analysis and in terms of final judgments, each case
must be approached individually and the available evidence must
be assayed in the light of the economic characteristics of the mar-
kets affected. Moreover, the nature of the product, whether a neces-
sity or a convenience item, and the availability of substitutes may
require a more circumscribed, or a broader, definition of the mar-
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ket. One merger may confront one group of industrial users with
the problem of adapting their process to changes in the availability
of materials; another merger may confront other industrial users
having no alternate source of supply with an insoluble dilemma.
The number of buyers, their relative strength, and the alternatives
open to them must all be scrutinized.
Just as proponents of a merger may seek to define the market
in terms which are most favorable to their view of the case, so it
may be expected that they will show a preference for the economic
tests which minimize the competitive consequences of their action.
Any temptation to accept a single test of competitive consequences
should be resisted, at least until fuller experience with a large
array of cases has provided some clear indications as to their sig-
nificance. The appealing argument that a single test would pro-
vide greater certainty in judging which mergers are legal is basical-
ly misleading, for each industry and each market situation will
give differing economic significance to the same test.
During the developmental stage of the new merger law, there
will be a tendency to multiply evidence by developing additional
tests of competitive consequences. This experimental, case-by-case
approach to measures of competitive consequences affords the best
hope of determining the usefulness of economic data in assaying the
competitive results of mergers. As the several tests are placed on
trial before the commission and courts, experience will demon-
strate that some have greater reliability than others, and that in
particular circumstances, tests which closely duplicate one an-
other may safely be omitted.
In summary, every substantial acquisition has some competi-
tive effects, even though present methods of economic analysis
may be inadequate to identify and measure them. Every such ac-
quisition and merger may, indeed almost inevitably will, adversely
affect some competitors, and where these competitors have been
sheltered from vigorous competition, the disturbance created may
appear to be serious. It is always necessary to distinguish between
a substantial lessening of competition which weakens the competi-
tive structure or behavior of markets and industries and an in-
vigorated competition which may worsen the market position of
particular competitors.
The structure of the markets affected is the beginning of any
analysis of competitive consequences. It involves such consider-
ations as the number of competitors, their relative equality or in-
equality in economic strength, the degree to which different com-
petitors are self-sufficient with respect to sources of supply and
outlets. The competitive characteristics of markets may be ex-
amined in terms of the realities of price competition, the flexibility
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or rigidity of producers' dependence upon particular resources, the
responsiveness of production to changes in demand, the continuity
of technological progress, the ease with which new competitors may
enter the industry, the availability of new capital for expansion,
the extent to which companies purchase supplies and dispose of
products in free and open markets, or contrariwise, the extent to
which they depend upon companies which are also their competi-
tors for either raw materials or outlets. On the basis of such anal-
yses, with explicit evaluations of the different categories of evi-
dence, the final judgment of the competitive consequences of
mergers must rest.
2 Categories of Evidence
There are many different categories of evidence in terms of
which the competitive consequences of an acquisition may be ex-
amined: the opinions of those familiar with the conduct of the
industry, the characteristics of competition in the past or a fore-
cast of competition to be expected, the prospective changes induced
by the acquisition or the actual competitive characteristics of the
market following the acquisition, the types of competitive behavior
characteristic of the industry, and statistical evidence with respect
to production, sales, prices and the like -all may be advanced as
evidence on the basis of which a decision should rest.
Opinion evidence as to the ultimate competitive effects fur-
nishes a weak basis for judging the consequences of an acquisition
or merger. The disabilities of opinion evidence arise partly from
the limited competence of witnesses, partly from unconscious ele-
ments of bias arising from their relationship to the market, and
partly from the unavailability of basic factual data.
Few witnesses may be expected to have the breadth of com-
petence which would enable them to recognize and weigh the
complex factors which determine the trend of competitive develop-
ment in an industry. Equally experienced observers differ in their
judgments of the competitive nature of the industry and of the
competitive effects of changes therein. Witnesses identified with
individual companies will not, as a rule, have access to sufficient
information concerning other companies to give validity to their
analyses. And too often witnesses identified with the industry will
have their appraisals colored by their own experience, and per-
haps even by their estimates of the commission's success in dealing
with the problem under investigation. Finally, industry witnesses
are likely to associate injury to individual companies with injury
to markets, losing sight of the commission's responsibility to pre-
serve vigorous competition and of the inevitable problems which
competition creates for individual companies.
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Opinion evidence, however, has its uses. It may be sought re-
specting specific decisions by individual business firms on such
matters as expansion in capacity, changes in the character of the
product or in the volume of production, entry into new markets
or withdrawal from old markets, and changes in technology, to
mention a few specific examples. Competent opinions with respect
to specific conduct by identified business units, when supported by
an explanation of the facts supporting the opinions and the con-
siderations directing the decision, may provide significant evidence
respecting competitive changes in markets or industries.
Facts respecting the organization and the conduct of an in-
dustry are to be preferred to predictions as to broad competitive
developments. A factual analysis of the organization and conduct
of an industry, of the structure and behavior of competitive mar-
kets, provides a basis for evaluating changes in the industry's or-
ganization and market structure. The objective of economic anal-
ysis should be to present the salient characteristics of industries
and markets explicitly, in terms of identifiable elements which re-
main unchanged or which may be subjected to specific changes in
consequence of the merger.
Evidence of actual consequences arising from an acquisition
or merger may be offered either to support the complaint or to
rebut the allegation of competitive injury. If evidence of actual
injury to competition becomes available, this evidence may ap-
propriately be cited. But the absence of evidence of actual injury
to competition may not be taken as indicative that the merger is
without injurious results. Counsel for acquiring companies have
shown sharp concern to learn whether the commission has received
complaints arising from such transactions and there has been evi-
dence of special care to preserve existing sources of supply, to
create favorable markets for those selling raw materials, to supply
jobbers and dealers, to avoid price increases, and the like, in con-
nection with mergers being investigated. Finally, the commission
cannot be required to await evidence of actual competitive conse-
quences, since this might delay a decision until all possibility of re-
storing competitive conditions has disappeared.
The character of the available statistical evidence deserves
particular attention. It has been argued, for example, that evidence
respecting market shares is an indispensable test of the legality or
illegality of the acquisition. Undue deference to statistical evidence,
and specifically to evidence of market shares, could undermine the
enforcement of Section 7. Much of the factual evidence respecting
the organization of industry and markets takes the form of sta-
tistics of production, shipments, sales and the like, but these figures,
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divorced from an analysis of the industry and market to which they
apply, have little meaning.
Two problems always arise in considering the availability of
evidence. First, many companies regard statistics of operations as
confidential and are opposed to furnishing them lest their competi-
tive position be prejudiced. A second difficulty relates to the degree
of reliability or certainty which attaches to economic evidence. If
full returns from all units are not available, there is inevitably a
lower degree of certainty than customarily attaches to other types
of evidence, as for example, the documentary evidence often in-
troduced in conspiracy and monopoly cases. But these shortcom-
ings do not preclude the use of such data when properly supported
by other economic analyses.
The most difficult problem in preparing Section 7 cases is the
transition from general economic considerations to specific evi-
dentiary facts. Two distinct steps are involved: first, the general
questions must be translated into specific questions with respect
to which economic facts may be collected, and secondly, the eco-
nomic facts to answer the specific questions must be available.
The first step, the transition from general to specific questions,
may be illustrated with an example. A number of writers have
urged that the behavior of the industry should be an important
element in judging whether an industry is competitive. The pro-
gressiveness of the industry, the introduction of new products, the
improvement of old products, the development of new technologies
and other similar factors have been cited as indicative of active
competition in an industry. However, specific objective tests have
not been developed to evaluate these factors and perhaps cannot
be devised. It may be possible to point to new products which have
been introduced, to improvements in old products, to new tech-
nologies that have been adopted by the industry; this is quite dif-
ferent from establishing that there might not have been a greater
rate of progress had the industry been more competitive than it
in fact was. Moreover, these behavior elements are matters for
managerial judgment and the fact that one management may judge
the time inappropriate for the introduction of new technology is
not proof that another management under greater competitive
pressure might not have risked the introduction and developed it
effectively. Even such seemingly objective economic facts as the
relationship between prices and costs are hardly reliable evidence,
considered alone, for the proposition that an industry is competi-
tive; American industry abounds with examples of the expansion
in markets that has occurred with price reductions, demonstrating
that cost-price relationships are not static in a competitive industry.
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The second step relates to the compilation of economic facts
by which specific questions may be answered. In many instances
the essential facts respecting the operations of the acquiring and ac-
quired companies are available to the commission's staff; in some
instances even the commission's subpoena power may be ineffec-
tive to secure facts which are alleged not to be in existence. In yet
other cases the raw facts from which market analyses must be de-
rived may be available in the form of undifferentiated invoice
data, but the processing of such raw data may involve such an ex-
tensive operation as to make reliance thereon unduly costly. Where
the necessary facts relate to other companies in the industry, the
problem of access to information becomes more difficult, involving
possible questions of confidentiality as well as the reasonableness
of the burden which may be thrown upon companies which are not
parties to the merger.
3. Company Data and Industry and Market Figures
There may be some cases where a determination of the per-
centage of the market occupied by a particular seller or by a group
of sellers may appear to supply an obvious answer to questions of
competitive effect. Some discussions of mergers and their competi-
tive consequences have proceeded almost wholly in terms of such
statistics, perhaps even to the extent of implying that from these
statistics may be derived valid conclusions with respect to a whole
range of industry and market characteristics. An examination of
the availability and the validity of this class of statistical evidence
is therefore appropriate.
The key to this use of specific company data lies in the avail-
ability of universe figures for the markets or industries which are
being studied. Yet such universe figures are available only in
special circumstances and only for certain markets. Where such
over-all figures are not readily available, an attempt to develop
them for the specific purposes of a Section 7 case might mean ac-
cepting a delay in the final decision which would foreclose any pos-
sibility of remedial action before the competitive markets sustained
irreparable damage. One must start therefore with a realization
that there are many instances where one may not speak with
certitude respecting the total size of an industry and even more
where certitude cannot be attained with respect to the total size
of a market.
The census reports offer only limited help in arriving at uni-
verse figures. Census reports are available only for specific years
and only on a basis of geographic units which do not normally co-
'incide with economic markets. Moreover, the products and indus-
tries with respect to which census presents its data are frequently
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more inclusive than the product or industry category which is
relevant for a particular case, or conversely the product may be
scattered through several census categories. And if there are few-
er than four companies reporting, the non-disclosure rule will cause
census to suppress the figure, and these are the cases where our
need is most urgent.
Similar, though lesser, difficulties are encountered with respect
to industries and products for which information is gathered by the
Bureau of Mines and the Tariff Commission. It is only for a few
products which are subject to regulation or taxation that statistics
are available in significant detail. It is possible for such products as
beverage alcohol, cigarettes, automobiles, and a few more, to secure
quantitatively accurate universes.
Some trade associations have sought to develop information
with respect to capacity, production and sales and where their
membership includes all, or a substantial proportion, of the indus-
try, they may have fairly reliable figures. Yet figures from trade as-
sociation sources are seldom subject to verification by examining
the sources from which the data are compiled, and hence, even if
available, would be subject to some infirmities.
There are also industry and market surveys conducted by
commercial organizations to guide manufacturers and sellers in
planning advertising budgets and production schedules. These fig-
ures are used as a basis for managerial decisions, often involving
large expenditures, both for sales promotion and for capital in-
vestment. But again these figures are seldom verifiable by examin-
ation of the sources from which the figures are derived.
Various other measures have been proposed for evaluating the
size or the market position of companies- sales, assets, profits,
shipments, purchases, receipts, capacity, payroll, or raw material
consumption. Such figures are, however, subject to all of the basic
difficulties inherent in measurements of market shares as well as
some additional individual defects. While a statistic of this kind
may, where uniformly available for a wide range of companies,
give some indication of certain charactistics of the company, it can
rarely, if ever, be sufficient to determine competitive consequences.
Precise figures with respect to the percentage share of the mar-
ket held by the acquiring and the acquired companies are neither
essential in all cases to a judgment as to the competitive effects of
a merger, nor when available, are they likely to be sufficient alone
to support a conclusion as to competitive consequences.
The percentage share of the market which is held by an indi-
vidual company, considered without other evidence, could be con-
clusive only when the percentage is so high as to be indicative
of monopoly. In other circumstances to rely solely on figures which
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are indicative of the share of the market is to assume that there is
a direct correlation between size and competitive behavior, be-
tween size and a substantial lessening of competition. Within the
range of magnitudes encountered in most industries, this one-to-
one relationship has not been established.
In the early and experimental stage in the regulation of mergers
and acquisitions, the basic economic problems are beginning to
come into focus. As yet, no case has been adjudicated on the merits,
and only one private suit involving the amended Section 7 has
reached the courts. Not only are the tests of illegality so far unaf-
firmed by legal authority but even the questions in terms of which
the basic issues are to be framed are still being formulated. Sec-
tion 7 has introduced a new dimension into management's plan-
ning for corporate expansion, but many of the questions as to what
that dimension means in practice must await the test of enforce-
ment and adjudication.
